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ADAPTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
RANCHING, IRRIGATION, AND DRY LAND FARMING IN 
SOUTHERN ALBERTA, 1880-1914 
A. A. DEN OTTER 
For centuries the nutntlous grasses of the 
southwestern fringe of the Canadian prairies 
supported an abundance of game, providing 
ample food for its nomadic peoples. Not until 
the middle of the nineteenth century did 
anyone look to this area as a farming frontier. l 
By the 1850s, however, the curiosity of Ca-
nadians about it was increased by a need for 
new territories for investment, scientific esti-
mates that the land was more favorable for 
agriculture than had previously been believed, 
and the fiery rhetoric of expansionist journal-
ists. 2 The need for more accurate knowledge 
prompted the Canadian and British govern-
ments to send scientific expeditions to Rupert's 
Land, the vast area that drained into Hudson's 
Bay. The Canadian party, led by geologist 
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H. Y. Hind, and the British group, under the 
command of Captain John Palliser, identified a 
fertile belt along the Saskatchewan River and a 
large arid region to the south (fig. 1).3 The 
prairies, an environment to be adapted to 
perceived needs, had taken on new economic 
value, a utility that could be realized only 
through exploitation. 
Acquiring the Northwest from the Hud-
son's Bay Company took a decade and wrest-
ing the land from the native peoples another. 4 
Once Canadian ownership was secured, the 
struggle for control and means of exploitation 
continued. The government land policy as set 
forth in the Dominion Lands Act called for 
the settlement of one family on every two 
quarter sections of land, but some areas of the 
prairies were unsuited for intensive cultiva-
tion. The extent of the barren land, soon 
known as Palliser's Triangle, varied with the 
attitude of the speaker toward colonization of 
the West. In the southwestern fringe of the 
prairies, which was semiarid, ranchers argued 
that the habitat was ideally suited for grazing, 
that it required no investment to adapt it for 
utilization. Farmers, on the other hand, in-
sisted that with modern irrigation techniques 
the environment could accommodate inten-
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FIG. l. Vegetation Zones: Western Canada. 
sive cultivation. Complicating the debate, 
promoters of dry land farming declared that 
their techniques were capable of farming the 
wilderness. So there were three views of the 
land's arability. Proposed land use defined the 
character of the habitat. Supporting the feder-
al government's search for new lands, Canadi-
an officials of the International Boundary 
Survey and the North West Mounted Police 
agreed that, except for some undefined "lim-
ited area," the western plains were suitable for 
agriculture. s 
Plans for a transcontinental railway dis-
solved the last doubts about the arability of 
the plains. Defiant of all geographical barriers 
and immune to most weather conditions, the 
railway assumed a mythical status so intense 
that many promoters accepted the most opti-
mistic assessments of the territories through 
which they projected their routes. The lush-
ness of the prairies during a particularly wet 
cycle at the end of the 1870s prompted John 
Macoun, an irrepressible botanist, to declare 
that virtually all the northwestern interior was 
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habitable. Desiring to build the shortest line 
practical, as close to their American rivals as 
possible, the directors of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway eagerly accepted Macoun's enthusias-
tic appraisal. They routed the CPR through 
the southern prairies, the heart of Palliser's 
Triangle.6 Forced to defend the CPR's route 
change, Sir Charles Tupper, the minister of 
railways and canals, gushed exuberantly, "We 
believe we have [on the prairies] the garden of 
the world," a view readily parroted by his 
Conservative colleagues. 7 Compelled by the 
change in railway plans to examine the south-
ern plains, the department asserted that ap-
pearances were deceiving and argued con-
descendingly that an experienced surveyor 
could recognize fertile land where a newcomer 
might see only barren country.8 
The official assessment of western climate 
and soil fertility was made by outsiders who 
imposed upon the region an image colored by 
their agricultural interests. Tragically, the 
white comer's ethos discounted the value of 
the landscape's natural life, and soon his 
efficient guns destroyed the abundant game 
that had blanketed the grasslands while sur-
veys and railways transformed the commonly 
held expanse into privately owned real estate.9 
Starvation forced the original prairie people to 
abandon their traditional way of life and 
accept integration into a new economy. 10 
CA TILE RANCHING 
For several decades, cattie ranchers filled 
the vacuum left by the disbanded natives and 
decimated game. The same physical features 
that had sustained wildlife proved ideal for 
pastoral use (fig. 2). Nutritious shortgrasses 
furnished abundant food throughout the sum-
mer, numerous coulees and river valleys pro-
vided shelter from vicious winter storms, while 
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warm Chinook winds regularly melted the 
snow cover." Utilizing their political influence, 
a small number of central Canadian and 
British businessmen extracted large grazing 
leases from the Dominion government (fig. 3). 
By 1887, barely a dozen big companies occu-
pied nearly ten million acres of prime grass-
lands, a development ideally suited to the 
semiarid ecology but clearly contrary to the 
government's homestead policy and an offense 
to land-hungry settlers. I I 
The privileged position of the ranchers 
sparked a bitter struggle for control of western 
lands. When the North West Mounted Police 
evicted several squatters from the grazing 
leases, public reaction was so hostile that in 
1892 the government opened the leases to 
settlement. It also required the ranchers to 
FIG. 2. The prairie grasslands were ideally suited for grazing. Public Archives of Canada. 
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FIG. 3. Southern Alberta: Leased Grazing Lands 1886. 
purchase at least one-tenth of their leases at 
$1.20 an acre, a concession that the affluent 
among them quickly accepted. I] 
Undaunted, the ranchers developed a 
more effective means of maintaining control 
over the rangelands. A key player in the 
formation and implementation of this strategy 
was William Pearce, nominally the Dominion 
government's inspector of mines but actually 
its general agent in the Northwest. A surveyor 
by training, Pearce had an unusual apprecia-
tion of conservation and planning. Believing 
that reckless and destructive exploitation of 
prairie soil could destroy that invaluable 
natural resource, he called for its wise and 
systematic utilization. 14 In the mid-1880's, with 
the enthusiastic backing of the ranchers, he 
launched a vigorous campaign for the creation 
of stock water reserves on the semiarid western 
prairies. li Pearce warned the government that 
squatters were fencing off rich riverbottom 
lands and lake shores. Fences rendered useless 
thousands of acres of surrounding semiarid 
grasslands by preventing cattle from reaching 
these rivers, lakes, or sloughs for water or 
shelter. Arguing that the government should 
protect the ranching industry, Pearce sug-
gested reserving from settlement all lands 
surrounding crucial bodies of water in the 
Calgary, Macleod, and Medicine Hat trian-
gle.'1; 
Deferring to the politically powerful ranch-
ers, the Conservative government in Decem-
ber 1886 declared that large sections of the 
southwestern prairies were closed to agricultur-
al settlement." William Pearce applied this 
policy in uncompromising fashion, evicting 
numerous squatters from the water reserves, 
seldom bothering with cumbersome court 
proceedings. When written warnings failed to 
dislodge squatters, he encouraged ranchers, 
under police supervision, to pull down farm 
buildings. lo Although these tactics aroused 
bitter resentment, Pearce never doubted that 
they were necessary to save the range for 
grazing; by 1896 he had protected virtually all 
the southwestern streams and rivers so that 
settlement was nearly impossible within a 
broad band running along the foothills south 
of Calgary to the American border. It was a 
significant victory for the ranchers, an unwrit-
ten accommodation permitting them to main-
tain their dominance on the southwestern 
plains. IC) 
The water reserve system represented the 
ranchers' attempt to have the Southwest 
treated as a distinct geographical region, a 
peculiar physiography that needed protection 
to maintain its character and potential. Such a 
policy required a high degree of government 
supervision and regulation; it demanded, for 
example, that the North West Mounted Police 
assume the unpopular and onerous 
responsibility of protecting the vested interests 
of absentee central Canadian and foreign 
investors. 2l1 Its success, however, hinged en-
tirely on the region's relative isolation and the 
ranchers' political power. Those were precar-
ious preconditions, especially by the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
RAIL WAYS AND IRRIGATION 
The ranching preserve began to crumble in 
the mid-nineties. Leading the onslaught was 
the Alberta Railway and Coal Company. 
Originally launched as a coal-mining enter-
prise, the AR&CC had earned 1.1 million 
acres of land as a subsidy for building a railway 
eastward from its collieries at Lethbridge to the 
Canadian Pacific mainline near Medicine Hat 
and another southward to Montana. Fully 
aware of the aridity of its properties, the 
company intended to sell land to ranchers 
rather than farmers and, under an amendment 
to the Dominion Lands Act, it received a 
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bonus in alternate townships rather than the 
prescribed sections. 21 Despite the unusual 
concession, the company could not compete 
with the government's generous leasing policy; 
by 1889, the company had sold less than an 
eighth of its grazing land and was looking for 
profitable optionsY One alternative was the 
sale of nearly ten thousand acres near the 
present town of Cardston to Charles Ora 
Card, a charismatic Mormon leader. Card, 
who intended to settle a number of Mormon 
families on this land, had had extensive 
irrigation experience in Utah and prop~sed an 
irrigation scheme for southern Alberta. Al-
though the plan was premature and failed to 
attract financial backers, it created a whole 
new perspective on Alberta's semiarid lands.21 
One of the strongest advocates of irrigation 
was the AR&CC's land commissioner, 
Charles A. Magrath. An aggressive executive, 
and a prominent territorial politician, Ma-
grath was the ideal champion of irrigation. 
Like many late-nineteenth-century Canadians, 
he had a vision of reconstructing the western 
wilderness into a productive, civilized society.24 
Central to his argument was the theme that 
the land had little economic worth in its 
natural state. But, he declared, "by assisting 
irrigation the balance of [thesellands will be so 
enhanced in value that one acre will bring as 
much as five acres and ten acres in other 
districts where irrigation is not absolutely 
required."" 
The territorial press, particularly the Leth-
bridge News, joined the call for irrigation. 
Cognizant of the benefits of irrigation to the 
local economy, the News insisted that the 
federal government, as the largest landowner 
in the territories, should assume the cost of 
initial surveys and water measurements, an 
expensive but necessary step to prevent a 
costly and inefficient conglomeration of hap-
hazardly built irrigation ditches. The govern-
ment should also provide assistance to private 
firms to build the necessary works. Subsidies 
were justified because irrigation ditches were 
essential to settlement. "Railway after railway 
may be built through a section of the country 
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until it is covered with a network of iron rails," 
the News asserted, "but the country will never 
be a paying speculation until there is agricul-
tural production."'" By the mid-1890s, there-
fore, an influential number of local residents 
no longer perceived their immediate environ-
ment to consist of valuable rangelands. The 
land's economic value could be realized only 
through intensive cultivation: the natural 
habitat had to be changed to suit the occupier. 
This was a fundamental transformation in 
environmental perceptions. 
Modifying the environment was not 
among the priorities of federal administrators 
and politicians. Worried that a debate on 
irrigation might damage the image of the 
Northwest among prospective settlers, the 
deputy minister of the interior, A. M. Burgess, 
warned his officials to "deal gently with the 
question" because "at this stage of the history 
of the country, much harm would result from 
any public discussion which would seem to 
indicate that any considerable proportion of 
the land is unfit for cultivation except by the 
aid of irrigation."ZI Even western politicians 
refused to accept the need for irrigation. 
Voicing the prevailing sentiment that the 
entire West was suitable for cultivation, R. 
Watson, the member of parliament from 
Manitoba, angrily denounced the proponents 
of irrigation for circulating reports that sec-
tions of the prairies were arid.Z8 Faced with a 
serious economic slump and a sluggish flow of 
settlers into the Northwest, few politicians felt 
any need for an experimental program of 
questionable necessity. 
Government opposition to irrigation could 
not last indefinitely. A prolonged drought, 
which began in the Southwest in the late 1880s 
and lingered into the early 1890s, created the 
nagging fear that perhaps dryness was the 
prevailing feature. Angry farmers, haunted by 
the specter of failure, agitated for relief, 
blaming the CPR and the Canadian govern-
ment for leading them to the western prairies. 
In this climate of opinion, the persistent 
arguments of Magrath and the southern 
Alberta press began to take effect. So did 
rumors that Montana was planning to divert 
part of the St. Mary River for an irrigation 
scheme of its own, thus threatening the 
Canadian project. 20 
The Canadian government was being 
forced to acknowledge the necessity of irriga-
tion in southern Alberta also because it was 
finding it difficult to meet the land subsidy 
requirements of the Canadian Pacific Railway. 
The transcontinental's subsidy stipulated that 
the lands must be fit for settlement· and the 
company was reluctant to accept the semiarid 
lands west of Medicine Hat. The problem was 
the scarcity of suitable land elsewhere in the 
territories, and so CPR President William Van 
Horne accepted William Pearce's arguments 
that irrigation could make southern Alberta 
lands useful and valuable. ill However, irriga-
tion was possible only if the railway company 
owned all the lands in a single block so that it 
would not have to dig its canals and laterals 
through private property. Only if the govern-
ment granted the lands in southern Alberta as 
a large single block, Van Horne insisted, 
would the CPR "take the chance of them being 
hereafter made available for settlement and 
cultivation by some comprehensive system of 
irrigation. "11 
The powerful railway lobby, backed by 
strident public opinion, forced the government 
to reassess its anti-irrigation stand. Instrumen-
tal in reappraising its policy was William 
Pearce. Always an ardent advocate of western 
resource development, Pearce believed that 
irrigation could remedy the irregularity of 
rainfall on the southwestern prairies. Since 
1885 his reports to the Department of the 
Interior had urged the central government 
actively to encourage extensive irrigation proj-
ects and to preserve the region's scarce water 
resources through careful regulation. Keeping 
closely in touch with American and other 
irrigation associations and publications, Pearce 
learned that large-scale projects were the only 
efficient users of water and soil. '2 To demon-
strate that irrigation was feasible, Pearce 
attempted a pilot project near Calgary in the 
1890s but experienced countless difficulties 
assembling land. He faced considerable public 
opposition and failed to gather the necessary 
financial backing. Eventually, the Department 
of the Interior ordered him to abandon his 
personal involvement in the irrigation scheme, 
at considerable financial lossY 
By 1894 the government had accepted the 
desirability of irrigation for the western fringe 
of the prairies and determined to ensure its 
orderly implementation. A. M. Burgess urged 
the government to support the CPR irrigation 
scheme because "the growing of cereals could 
only be rendered safe and sure by the applica-
tion of an extensive and scientifically planned 
system of irrigation."H After consultations 
with western Canadian, American, and other 
irrigation experts, the government in July 1894 
passed the North West Irrigation Act, making 
SOUTHERN ALBERTA 177 
itself the sole owner of all the western interior 
waters and providing for their controlled 
development. 's In the summer of 1895, J. S. 
Dennis, the chief inspector of surveys and an 
active supporter of irrigation, launched a 
comprehensive survey of southern Alberta 
rivers "so that an intelligent control might be 
exercised in the application of the available 
water supply for the reclamation of unproduc-
tive areas."" After several years of exhaustive 
expeditions, Dennis determined that irrigation 
was possible at several locations across the 
southwestern plains, including the St. Mary 
River. Lastly, the government allowed the 
AR&CC to consolidate most of its lands into 
a solid block south of Lethbridge (fig. 4).'1 
Government studies and concessions did 
not spur the immediate completion of the two 
116' 110' 
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FIG. 4. Southern Alberta: Land Granted En Bloc. 
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large-scale irrigation projects, the Bow River 
and the St. Mary River schemes. Although a 
feasibility study concluded that the Bow River 
could irrigate about two million acres of 
farmlands, the CPR's directors refused to 
approve the project. J8 With a federal election 
near at hand, officials of the CPR, as well as of 
the AR&CC decided to delay the implementa-
tion of any extensive irrigation works. The 
long-lived Conservative administration still 
refused emphatically to grant financial assis-
tance to any project as long as lands with 
adequate rainfall were available elsewhere on 
the prairies. J9 While local promoters recognized 
the need for irrigation, central Canadian and 
foreign investors took a more cautious ap-
proach and refused to move without sufficient 
government incentives. 
A complex series of events in the mid-
nineties brought a dramatic change in the 
perception of the southwestern prairies. Spec-
tacular gold discoveries in South Africa were 
partially responsible for halting the decline in 
world wheat prices and generating a great 
feeling of optimism. At the same time, as 
sub humid homestead lands in the United 
States and Canada ran out, settlers began to 
look to the semiarid Canadian Northwest, 
where the introduction of dryfarming tech-
niques and hardier wheat strains made agricul-
ture more profitable than ever before. 4o 
Improvements in the technology of shipping 
wheat overseas, such as grain elevators, rail-
ways, and large grain ships, enabled the 
interior prairies to become one of the world's 
great granaries. Aided by the new economic 
buoyancy and the Dominion government's 
revamped immigration program, western Can-
ada attracted hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
can, British, and European immigrants every 
year. As the trickle of settlers swelled into a 
flood, western Canadian development once 
again interested foreign financiers and irriga-
tion in southern Alberta became an attractive 
investment. 
The irrigation projects profited also from a 
change in government. In 1896, Wilfrid Lau-
rier's liberals replaced the beleaguered Con-
servatives and a new perception of the far 
western prairies gained prominence. The lib-
erals, naturally inclined toward decentraliza-
tion and the welfare of the farmer, eventually 
sided with the settlers. Soon they were com-
mitted to turning the semiarid rangelands into 
cultivated fields. This attitude was expressed 
most clearly by Frank Oliver, the gadfly 
member of parliament from Alberta and editor 
of the Edmonton Bulletin. An avowed cham-
pion of western settlement, Oliver ceaselessly 
attacked the large grazing leases and bitterly 
denounced the stock water reserves as detri-
mental to settlement. 41 Recognizing that the 
greater part of the southern ranching country 
was pastoral and "not suitable for cultivation," 
he suggested modifications in the homestead 
regulations to allow for tracts as large as 480 
acres, lower fees, and different cultivation 
requirements, so that smaller cattle owners 
and farmers could use the rangesY Oliver also 
advocated irrigation. "There is the strongest 
feeling amongst the people of the whole of the 
Southern country that this government must 
facilitate irrigation in every possible way," 
Oliver confided to Prime Minister Laurier. He 
urged the government to support irrigation 
with low land prices and lenient regulationsY 
Always concerned with the small operators, 
Oliver argued that it was "for the benefit of the 
Country that Irrigation should be entered into 
as largely as possible by all classes of settlerS."44 
Oliver found a sympathetic listener in the 
new minister of the interior, Manitoban 
Clifford Sifton. A fervent advocate of progress 
and efficiency, Sifton viewed prairie coloniza-
tion as a problem to be solved with proper 
marketing techniques. Canada had surplus 
land that needed to be sold through aggressive 
advertising in Europe, Britain, and the United 
States.4\ As a newcomer to the department and 
still under the influence of the old bureaucrats, 
Sifton approved more water reserves but soon 
worked out his own policy.46 Although not as 
strongly opposed to ranchers as Frank Oliver, 
Sifton favored farmers as the most productive 
users of land. Moreover, unlike his predeces-
sors, Clifford Sifton had no qualms about 
adverse publicity emanating from the demands 
of irrigationists, whose cause he actively sup-
ported. In 1897, after only one meeting with 
C. A. Magrath, Sifton promised to refund all 
the survey fees the AR&CC had paid on its 
land grant!; 
This modest subsidy coincided with the rise 
of new markets for southern Alberta crops. 
The extension of the CPR through the Crows-
nest Pass in 1897 provided access to the coal 
and metal deposits of the Crowsnest and 
Kootenai regions, creating new towns and an 
expanding market. Similarly, the Klondike 
gold rush stimulated the western economy and 
promised even more consumers. The prospect 
of a nearby market and the flood of immi-
grants onto the plains altered the image of the 
rangelands controlled by the AR&CC and the 
CPR; if irrigated, these properties could be 
converted into thousands of mixed farms at 
great profit to both companies. 48 
Circumstances enabled the AR&CC to 
alter the intended use for its land grant but 
also forced it to invest in expensive irrigation 
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technology in order to attract settlers. It was 
the only way to realize the economic value of 
its land subsidy. As Elliott Galt explained, 
"We had expended large sums [on the coal 
mines and railways] and we were compelled to 
go ahead and protect what we had already 
invested. " 49 Necessity, rather than intention, 
forced the company to reassess the southwest-
ern habitat. 
Backed by the optimistic reassessment of 
the economical potential of the Northwest, the 
newly formed Canadian North-west Irrigation 
Company bought 250,000 acres from its parent 
company, the AR&CC, and hammered out 
an agreement with the Mormon church to 
supply the labor for canal construction in 
exchange for land. The St. Mary River irriga-
tion scheme was a considerable undertaking, 
requiring 40 teams of horses in the fall of 1898 
and 200 the next year (fig. 5). Ironically, heavy 
rains plagued the region in 1899 and so 
hampered the work that the ditches were not 
finished until the following summer. By then, 
the workers had excavated 115 miles of canals, 
FIG. 5. St. Mary irrigation ditches under construction. Sir Alexander Galt Museum, Lethbridge, 
Alberta. 
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including a 32-mile branch to Lethbridge and 
a 22-mile extension to Stirling. 50 
The completion of the project and the rush 
of settlers into the western portion of the 
plains spurred the CPR to reconsider the Bow 
River project. Unwilling to initiate massive, 
expensive irrigation works, the CPR had 
awaited the outcome of the AR&CC's plan 
and contributed $100,000 to the venture, 
expecting increased rail traffic to return its 
investment. 51 It accepted as part of its subsidy a 
solid block of land east of Calgary between the 
Bow and Red Deer rivers, about 140 miles long 
and 40 miles wide (fig. 4). Canal construction 
for the western section of the block began in 
1903 on the Bow River just east of Calgary. By 
1914 an army of steam shovels, graders, trains, 
and horse-drawn wagons had completed about 
1,600 miles of canals and laterals. Company 
engineers, by then, had concluded that the 
elevation of the central section was too high 
for economical irrigation, but did commence 
work on the eastern sections, an engineering 
challenge that dwarfed the earlier Lethbridge 
and Western schemes. The CPR constructed a 
7,000-foot-long earthen embankment and a 
nO-foot concrete dam to raise the level of the 
Bow River near Bassano by 46 feet and divert 
some of its water into an irrigation canal. 
Completed in 1914, the Bassano dam and the 
large viaduct at Brooks made the CPR eastern 
irrigation works one of the world's foremost 
systems (fig. 6). In total, the CPR spent more 
than $18 million to adapt its semiarid lands to 
intensive cultivation. 52 Its purpose was simple: 
needing traffic for the railway, the CPR was 
willing to expend large sums of money to 
attract settlers to these territories. It assumed 
that land sales would recover the cost of 
irrigation. 
The two railway companies built efficient 
irrigation systems to sell their land grants and 
create traffic. Irrigation simply for land specu-
lation led to disaster. A case in point was the 
FIG. 6. Bassano Dam under con5truction. Glenbow Archives, Calgary, Alberta. 
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TABLE 1 
ACREAGE ACTUALLY IRRIGATED IN ALBERTA 1911 TO 1920 
Irrigation Districts 
Year St. Mary Taber 
1911 47,000 
1912 76,200 
1913 76,200 
1914 76,200 
1915 76,200 
1916 71,281 
1917 91,780 
1918 102,900 
1919 112,569 
1920 60,893 2,000 
Southern Alberta Land Company, a flashy 
combination of land speculators, politicians, 
and Canadian and British financiers. Shady 
real estate transactions, questionable charter 
transfers, and watered stocks placed a heavy 
drain on the company, while faulty designs 
and shoddy construction required extensive 
rebuilding. 53 By 1914 the company's land prices 
had soared to $41 per acre, well beyond the 
region's average, and the Southern Alberta 
Land Company and affiliated firms were 
bankrupt. Without the backing of a large and 
diversified corporation, irrigation was not a 
profitable venture. 
DRY LAND FARMING 
The successful completion of the St. Mary 
and Bow River irrigation projects coincided 
with the prairie-fire-like spread of dry land 
farming technology. Developed on the Ameri-
can Great Plains, the technique utilized deep 
plowing, subsurface packing, repeated cultiva-
tion, and special machinery to preserve the 
soil's moisture during droughts (fig. 7). Like a 
religious revival movement, dry land cultiva-
tion swept across the American plains and into 
Western Eastern Bow Total 
500 47,500 
500 76,700 
2,600 78,800 
8,448 7,806 92,454 
512 7,806 84,518 
859 1,497 73,637 
3,657 9,605 105,042 
25,191 24,440 152,531 
31,908 43,460 187,937 
4,083 60,762 4,240 131,978 
western Canada. Its advocates traveled the 
circuit like country preachers and published 
countless tracts and articles. Railways were 
especially ardent disciples, viewing the new 
method as their salvation from sluggish land 
sales and anemic traffic flows. 54 The Northern 
Pacific, the Soo Line, and the CPR established 
demonstration farms, subsidized publication of 
dry farming literature, and sponsored lecture 
tours. Equally enthusiastic were state and 
provincial governments. Anxious to lure set-
tlers to their jurisdictions and enlarge regional 
wealth, they also built model farms and 
supported exhibitions and congresses. Indica-
tive of the pervasiveness of the new gospel was 
the Seventh International Dry Farming Con-
gress held in Lethbridge, the headquarters of 
Alberta's first successful irrigation company. 
Meeting in 1912, the Congress was the largest 
held in North America, attracting five thou-
sand representatives from fifteen countries. 55 
The onset of a number of wet years at the 
turn of the century helped the cause of dry 
land farming immeasurably. The abundant 
rains that had plagued construction on the St. 
Mary's project continued throughout the first 
decade. Such wet cycles were typical of the 
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FIG. 7. Dry farm being prepared from virgin prairie. Sir Alexander Galt Museum, Lethbridge, 
Alberta. 
region and usually caused a greening of the 
environment. A similar period probably in-
fluenced Macoun's optimistic assessment of 
the prairies at the end of the 1870s. At the 
turn of the century, a recurrence of successive 
wet years, coupled to the general euphoria of 
prosperity, blinded officials and settlers to the 
realities of the semiarid habitat. With other 
areas filling rapidly, settlers poured into south-
ern Alberta. In September 1908, Lethbridge 
experienced its first land rush when more than 
a thousand eager settlers camped on the 
sidewalks by the government land office, 
waiting for it to open. i6 
Dry land farming, firmly entrenched in 
southern Alberta by the outbreak of the First 
World War, was the result of yet another 
perception of the environment. Like irrigation-
ists, drylanders saw nature as a force to be 
conquered and tamed. Such farming appeared 
scientific, producing clean, orderly, finely 
mulched fields. ;7 Consequently, the new tech-
nique became a potent rival to irrigation 
precisely when the railway companies had just 
spent millions of dollars to bring water to 
southwestern farms. 5O 
The advent of irrigated and dry land 
farming completed another stage in the reas-
sessment of the agricultural potential of the 
western edge of the prairies. As thousands of 
settlers spread across southern Alberta, ranch-
ers were forced to retreat farther and farther 
into the foothills. South of Lethbridge, for 
example, the Mormons bought nearly 300,000 
acres of rangeland, including the Cochrane 
Ranch. The consensus among politicians, 
businessmen, and settlers was that the range-
lands were suitable for cultivation. Driven by a 
confident belief in their ability to conquer the 
semiarid plains, all were convinced that south-
ern Alberta was best suited to their own 
endeavors. While they quarreled about the 
best method of utilizing the prairie soil, both 
irrigationists and dry landers agreed that graz-
ing leases and water reserves had to be 
abolished. i" 
By 1900, most officials in the Department 
of the Interior sided with the farmers and 
viewed the leases and reserves as narrow and 
outdated policies, especially when the powerful 
Calgary and Edmonton Railway Company 
complained that it had difficulty selecting 
lands because water reserves rendered so much 
of the surrounding area useless for cultiva-
tion. be' In 1901, the department signaled its new 
approach by demoting William Pearce, whose 
uncompromising methods had earned the 
enmity of so many settlers. The following 
spring, it decided to sell many of the water 
reserves, and two years later it opened certain 
grazing leases to homesteaders. The 1905 
appointment of Frank Oliver, the friend of the 
squatters, as minister of the interior marked 
the end of the rancher's hegemony on the 
plains. Oliver auctioned off 'more water re-
serves and tightened the leasing policy. Con-
vinced that very little of the western prairie 
was unfit for agriculture, he specifically or-
dered that the suitability of land be judged by 
soil conditions and not by climate.!>1 
The severe winter of 1906-07 contributed 
to the further decline of the cattle industry. 
Falling beef prices, unsatisfactory market con-
ditions, and increased provincial taxes aggra-
vated the desperate losses suffered in blinding 
blizzards and subzero temperatures. Mean-
while, wheat was rapidly becoming the 
glamorous money-making crop of the prairies. 
Producing better returns than beef, it in-
creased land values and thus made the ranges 
too expensive for economical grazing. Many 
ranchers quit, causing a fundamental change 
in the character of the western fringe of the 
plains. No one appeared to notice that, at the 
end of the first decade, dry years were replac-
ing the wet ones. If they did notice, dry land 
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farmers remained convinced their techniques 
could civilize the semiarid prairiesY 
The mushrooming popularity of dry land 
farming not only drove the ranching industry 
into the less valuable foothills, it also ham-
pered sales of irrigated lands. The wheat 
boom, associated with dry farms, made the 
costly irrigated properties economically unat-
tractive. The Canadian North-west Irrigation 
Company, which became part of the Alberta 
Railway and Irrigation Company in 1904, 
launched a counteroffensive using the tradi-
tional techniques of pamphlets, emigration 
agents, and excursions to lure farmers to its 
lands.'" But its general manager, Elliott T., 
Galt, also worked hard to develop the econ-
omy of the area. In 1903, he completed a 
branch railway from Stirling to Cardston. He 
also encouraged Raymond Knight, a wealthy 
Mormon, to cultivate sugar beets in southern 
Alberta. In 1901 Knight used eighty teams to 
break sixty thousand acres of prairie soil and 
in 1903 opened a sugar plant at Raymond. 64 
Galt also donated land at Lethbridge, build-
ings, seed, equipment, and one laborer to 
Professor William Fairfield of Wyoming. 
Fairfield established a model farm where he 
experimented with a variety of grains, grasses, 
fruits, and trees; he also spoke to numerous 
organizations and advised settlers on irrigation 
methods. Most significantly, he devised the 
technique of inoculating Alberta fields with 
soil from Wyoming that contained the nitro-
gen-fixing bacteria essential to healthy alfalfa 
cultivation."i In all these efforts, the AR&I was 
handsomely supported by the progress-minded 
federal government, including another land 
subsidy of five hundred thousand acres.OO 
The CPR, like the AR&I, made special 
efforts to attract homesteaders to its lands. The 
company appointed]. S. Dennis, formerly the 
government's chief inspector of surveys, as its 
commissioner of irrigation."; Dennis did not 
necessarily reject the possibility of using the 
Southwest for grazing; he wanted it settled 
compactly with nonirrigated grazing land 
interspersed with irrigated fields used to grow 
fodder and market crops. For Dennis, irriga-
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tion would do more than generate railway 
traffic, however; it would create densely settled 
prairies that would become the basis of a 
populated, prosperous, and industrialized 
West. Irrigation would, Dennis wrote to CPR 
President Shaughnessy, "have a marked influ-
ence not only upon the business of the 
company from a traffic point of view, but also 
upon the industrial development of the 
West."68 
Dennis developed a special paternalistic 
approach to land sales. He created the Canadi-
an Pacific Irrigation and Colonization Compa-
ny to sell farms that combined irrigated and 
nonirrigated lands. Although he willingly sold 
land to individuals, he preferred group set-
tlements because they provided an element of 
mutual cooperation that no private corpora-
tion could provide. The 1907 Polish Krakow 
colony in the western section was particularly 
successful, as were several Danish, Dutch, and 
French-Canadian efforts. Dennis also set mini-
mum standards; a house, for example, had to 
cost at least $350 and a homestead had to have 
one barn, several animals, and certain imple-
ments. These regulations ensured that only 
hard-working settlers with money would come 
to the region. Fairly soon, the CPR began to 
break and seed some of the plots before settlers 
arrived, partly because it wanted to attract the 
preferred British emigrants, many of whom 
were inexperienced farmers, but also to ensure 
that those who did buy company lands had 
substantial capital to invest in the enterprise. 
The ready-made farm became the basis for 
a new strategy Dennis established in 1911. 
Because sales were lagging, Dennis conducted 
a comprehensive inventory of the lands, 
consolidated them into small manageable 
districts, and rid them of speculators. By the 
end of the year, his department had drafted 
two hundred blueprints for established farms 
where CPR crews prepared the land for the 
first crop and built a house and barns. The 
Bassano area, for instance, was totally planned 
much like a modern-day subdivision; it includ-
ed 550 ready-made farms of 160 acres arranged 
in groups of twenty-five. At Brooks, the Duke 
of Sutherland established twelve small farms 
for the sons of his tenants in Scotland, all 
clustered around one elaborate central farm 
where he spent some time each summer. Such 
paternalistic, centralized planning ensured 
that the region looked prosperous and attrac-
tive to prospective buyers. 
Hope for success, or at least its appearance, 
FIG. 8. One of several CPR supply fanns in western Canada. Provincial Archives of Alberta: 
Photograph Collection AI0545. 
demanded that the CPR teach farmers proper 
irrigation and cultivation techniques. It estab-
lished a large demonstration farm at the 
headquarters of the western section in Strath-
more and four smaller model farms in the 
eastern region (fig. 8). It sold farmers improved 
livestock and experimented with animal hus-
bandry.69 At the time when wheat was the 
preferred crop, the CPR used free seed, demon-
strations, competitions, and prizes to encour-
age farmers to grow alfalfa. 70 It also instructed 
all its watermasters and ditchriders to plant 
trees and gardens around their homes, to keep 
them tidy and well painted, as an example to 
immigrants. 71 The CPR's program embodied 
an ideal; the railway company sought to 
transform radically what it perceived to be 
barren wilderness into an orderly, neat, and 
civilized society. 
The CPR, which also owned vast quanti-
ties of land south of the Bow River, expanded 
its education campaign to dry land farmers. 
Assuming that diversified operations provided 
more stable incomes, the company wanted 
settlers to lessen their dependence on wheat 
and grow other crops. Throughout the prewar 
years, it sponsored mixed-farming trains, lec-
tures, and courses to persuade farmers to 
cultivate corn, vegetables, even fruit, and to 
raise cows, pigs, and chickens. The CPR 
established a model farm at Vulcan to demon-
strate the advantages of diversification. Its 
efforts, actively supported by bureaucrats, 
scientists, and bankers, were of little avail: 
wheat remained the principal crop on dry land 
farms because it was ideally suited to the flat, 
deep soils of the Southwest, required little 
labor, and furnished the best returns for a 
relatively small investment. By 1911, more 
than three-quarters of the crop seeded south of 
the Bow River was wheat and southwestern 
farmers continued to import vegetables, but-
ter, eggs, and sometimes feed for their draft 
horses.72 
Irrigated and dry land farming radically 
altered the landscape of the western edge of 
the Canadian prairies. The short experiment 
of replacing the wild herds with domestic cattle 
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had failed by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, once the land took on economic value 
and had to be exploited as cost-effectively as 
possible. Homesteaders pushed the cattlemen 
into the foothills and transformed most of the 
open natural grasslands into fenced and culti-
vated fields. Farming, whether irrigated or dry 
land, drew settlers to southern Alberta and 
indirectly stimulated the growth of agricultur-
ally related industries, of towns and cities. 73 
This is what western promoters intended. 
They believed that the intensive settlement of 
the Northwest was to be the basis of a wealthy, 
industrialized nation. "Agriculture," A. S. 
Dawson, the CPR's irrigation engineer as-
serted, "may be considered as the trunk from 
which all business and industry must emanate 
and prosper."74 One of the orators at a 1907 
irrigation convention maintained that the 
intensive cultivation of land invariably led to 
industrial development; to the construction of 
dairies, abattoirs, breweries, sugar refineries, 
canneries, flour mills, even textile factories. 75 
Citing ancient history, the CPR's Dawson 
argued that the world's great civilizations had 
been built in response to arid environments.76 
Confident in their ability to adapt the envi-
ronment to their needs, these western nation-
builders saw cultivation as the first step toward 
a civilized, industrialized nation.71 
The businessmen who invested in the 
railways of southern Alberta had a somewhat 
less exalted view of the development of the 
region. C. A. Magrath best expressed this 
more practical attitude when he confessed that 
his company built irrigation works because 
"there was no alternative: the coal company 
had the lands and it became necessary to do 
something, as otherwise it looked as if the 
lands could never be utilized."78 His employer, 
Elliott Galt, revealed that the AR&CC's land 
could never have been settled and could not 
have been made valuable "except by means of 
large expenditures on the part of the Irrigation 
Company."79 The owners of the land therefore 
perceived it as an investment, and they had to 
transform it to protect their investment. 
Governments actively encouraged the in-
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tensive settlement of the western plains. Al-
though they supported irrigation as one 
method of settling the prairies, they preferred 
the cheaper dry land technique. Both federal 
and provincial administrations employed 
propaganda to lure thousands of settlers to the 
region. Convinced that the intensive set-
tlement of the West was in the national 
interest, they disregarded the insistent warn-
ings of local officials th1lt the western edge 
needed irrigation, that the return of "the 
average seasons" would force farmers from the 
land. Unfortunately, Canadian policymakers 
measured the nation's progress in terms of 
placing people on the land, of plowed acres 
and miles of fences. Their obsession blinded 
them to the aridity of the region and caused 
them to view it as well suited for cultivation. 
The optimistic assessments of government 
and business-their confident belief that mod-
ern agricultural techniques could tame the 
environment and adapt it to national and 
entrepreneurial needs-caused individual dis-
appointments. Even irrigationists were disillu-
sioned as the high cost of irrigated land and 
water rentals eroded profits. Too many fami-
lies learned at excessive cost that their exuber-
ant trust in modern technology had been 
misplaced. Adapting the environment was not 
a painless, easy task. Not until the irrigation 
companies surrendered their systems to farm 
cooperatives in the 1940s did irrigation be-
come financially feasible. S ! 
For the drylanders the disillusionment was 
more bitter. In 1910, expected spring rains 
dissipated and yielded to hot, searing winds 
that crumbled the pulverized mulch of sum-
mer-fallowed land to dust and carried it away 
in dark clouds. Although quickly forgotten in 
the euphoria of rising wheat prices, insatiable 
markets, and bumper crops, the dust storms 
caused irreparable damage and were an omi-
nous portent of the future. 82 In following 
decades, repeated droughts, always accompa-
nied by high winds and hungry grasshoppers, 
drove thousands of homesteaders from their 
land.'] Painstaking rehabilitative efforts were 
needed to rejuvenate the prairie soil and 
revitalize dry land farming." While dry land 
technology made Canada the leader in wheat 
exports, it brought heartache to thousands. 
Only after farmers assessed their environment 
realistically could they adapt it to their require-
ments. 
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